Security logging is interesting. Detecting security and compliance issues means uncovering nasty little leakages of unintentional or surprising information all over. When you add a powerful security tool to the environment, it starts to shine light into dark corners.
No one expects that temporary file of sensitive data or the password in a script to be recorded. Credential tokens start safe, but get copied to unsafe paths. They’re not intentional flaws, but rather hygiene issues.
If a tool detects security hygiene issues, the responding team must decide if they believe the tool or not, and then what to do about it. As a vendor planning that security tool, figuring out which way the customer team will go is an existential crisis.
Obviously, if the customer doesn’t believe the tool, that sale isn’t made or that renewal doesn’t happen. Less obviously, even if the customer does believe the tool, success is not guaranteed. The social angles are too complex for today’s thread.
The logical path for tool developers is to log any data, offending or otherwise.
It’s impossible to describe every possible problem scenario & filter objectionable material. Even getting low hanging fruit is bad, it builds an expectation that the tool solves hard problems too.
Worse, if the tool does not record the raw data and only records that a user did a prohibited thing at place and time... then the tool won’t be trusted. The user doesn’t remember doing a bad thing, and now it’s human versus log. Human wins.
So financial pressure leads to security tools logging everything they see. This is not ideal because it can mean worsening the security situation by logging and transmitting secure tidbits. Instead of searching every mattress in town, our raccoon-masked baddie can rob the bank.
Because belief is ahead of action in the customer’s decision path, data collection problems are true of failing security tools as well as successful ones. Everyone wants to be trusted, so everyone records at high fidelity.
Encrypt all the things is then used to protect these high value stores. I’m reminded of the DRM problem though... the data has to be in usable form to get used, so there’s always an exposure somewhere. Makes you wonder how many SOCs have extra folks listening in.